On Scientific Method in the Study of Art by Marquand, Allan
 
European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy 
VIII-2 | 2016
Pragmatism and the Writing of History
On Scientific Method in the Study of Art
Allan Marquand









Allan Marquand, « On Scientific Method in the Study of Art », European Journal of Pragmatism and
American Philosophy [Online], VIII-2 | 2016, Online since 16 January 2017, connection on 03 May 2019.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/651  ; DOI : 10.4000/ejpap.651 
This text was automatically generated on 3 May 2019.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
On Scientific Method in the Study of
Art
Allan Marquand
C. Oliver O’Donnell (ed.)
EDITOR'S NOTE
[undated, delivered 1889] 
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For the original manuscript, see “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art”; dates not
examined; Allan Marquand Papers (C0269), Box 10 Folder 22; Manuscripts Division,
Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 
1 The original manuscript is handwritten in pen and pencil on fifty-five loose sheets of
paper, each measuring approximately 14 x 20 cm. The original pages are numbered in the
top left corner; however, there are two pages numbered 30 and no page 23, presumably
due to extensive editing on Marquand’s part. In addition to Marquand’s at times difficult
handwriting, there are many corrections in the original manuscript (including extensive
crossings-out  and  even  some  pasted  over  sections)  which  make  deciphering  some
sentences  difficult.  To facilitate  future comparisons and potential  corrections,  I  have
marked the end of each page in the original manuscript with corresponding numbers in
brackets  within  the  text  of  this  transcription.  Sections  of  text  in  brackets  in  this
transcription indicate doubt as to Marquand’s intent or an addition made by the editor
for the sake of clarification. Sections of text in this transcription with strike-through font
indicate  that  Marquand  crossed  these  words  out  in  the  original  manuscript.  I  have
omitted the vast majority of Marquand’s crossings-out; however, those that I judged to be
of  interest  for  intellectual  history  and that  could be  incorporated  with  ease,  I  have
included.  Underlined sections in this  transcription reflect  underlining in the original
manuscript.
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2 The reformation of the sciences by means of which we have received a new chemistry, a
new astronomy, a new science of which and a new history is the result of applying to
these departments of knowledge the method of observation and reasoning now known as
the scientific method. This method is not very new with application to the study of art
and yet so lasting have been the results [1] of unscientific attempts that it is worth our
while to stop and consider, perhaps to justify the method of our work. [Let us glance first
at those unscientific methods to be distinguished from ours.]
3 1. The mystical method. It is a very general belief amongst uneducated people that art is a
mystery which they cannot comprehend which nevertheless they can apprehend and
admire. How many a man or a woman do we see standing in rapt admiration over a
picture or a statue, simply because they apprehend that it was a work of art. Whether it
was [2] fine art or despicable art they make no attempt to decide but appeal for such
judgment to the guidance of others. To supply the demand for such judgments there
spring up pretending critics whose only function it is to pronounce upon works of art.
What the foundation of those judgments may be matters little provided they be clear and
distinct and the popular want is satisfied. It is enough to say of the mystical method that
there is no such mystery in works of art. There is no super or sub natural quality that
removes  art  from human comprehension;  and  no  necessity  therefore  for  an  artistic
priest-craft,  and  no  hope  that  by  this  method  we  could  ever  reach  judgments  of
permanent value, or anything like consensus of thinking minds. [3]
 
Allan Marquand, first page of “On Scientific Method in the Study of Art.” 
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4 A  second  method  which  we  claim  as  unscientific  may  be  best  designated  as  the
metaphysical method. Thinkers of this class transfer the distinctions of philosophy to the
domain of art. They look upon art as practical philosophy and [as a phenomenon] to be
explained by the ideas which philosophy supplies. One of the principle distinctions which
they have succeeded in applying to the value of art – and to literature as well – is the
distinction between the real and the ideal. [The distinction has no longer a vigorous vital
hold upon philosophy itself. It not only involves a confusion of thought, inasmuch as real
things  are  not  identical  with  non-ideal  things  and  idealities  are  not  identical  with
unrealities, but it no longer expresses an important means of classifying philosophical
thinkers.] [4] Whenever [this distinction] has been adopted in art criticism it has only
[made] confusion of thought. We shall be better off by rejecting it altogether.
5 Another notion which has a still stronger hold upon our [conceptions] concerning art is
that it is concerned with the Beautiful. But metaphysical conceptions of the beautiful fall
short of the requirements [of a scientific method] because they import as fundamental [5]
notions which are not fundamental to art. Thus with Hegel, the beautiful is the absolute
in sensuous existence, the actuality of the Idea in the form of limited manifestation. All I
need say [of] the connection is that if the object of our search be the absolute as the Idea,
we [may] undoubtedly widen our conceptions by considering works of art in addition to
other phenomena. But if our search be limited to works of art, our fundamental notion
must be that of art itself. [6] As a matter of fact beauty may be present or absent in works
of art. We may search for it there, if we please – but we may search for it as well in the
orderly  arrangement  of  the  stars,  in  the  constructive  characters  of  chemical
combinations,  in physics,  in botany, in biology, in literature. [Once the conception of
beauty has been objectively established, it will be interesting to have its developments in
works of art. But in works of art as a whole, beauty is so rarely a leading motive that this
inquiry would confine our attention to a comparatively narrow field.] 
6 The metaphysical method is a step in advance of the mystical [7] and for two reasons.
First, by an analysis of the contents of consciousness it seeks to do away with mysteries
and make our ideas clear. Second, by the very attempt to reach rational judgments, it
abandons the individualistic position of the mystic and reaches conclusions the grounds
of  which  may  be  tested  by  other  minds.  Metaphysical  methods  have  sometimes
anticipated  the  results  of  science,  as  when  Swedenborg  anticipated  the  nebular
hypothesis of La Place – but far more presently have metaphysicians failed, when they
have attempted to go beyond the universe of ideas and deal with material things. [8]
7 A third method in which the subject of art is frequently approached we may call the
literary method. I do not now refer to the use which is made of works of art as a means of
reconstructing before our imagination the records of past history and literature, but of
the infusion into the study of art the spirit of literary work. As I take it the distinguishing
[9]  characteristic  of  the  student  of  literature  is  the  attention  he  has  to  expression.
Thoughts or ideas are merely incidental to the literary student. They are included in the
material or presuppositions of his study. He has nothing to do with them until they are
expressed and then it is with the expression rather than the thought that his work is
concerned. The practical  creator of literature finds himself  in natural sympathy with
other artists because he sees in the architectonic, plastic, graphic and musical arts [10]
forms of expression more or less similar to his own. The various arts are to him other
languages, some closely others distantly related to his own, but all languages which man
speaks to man. We cannot listen to one of Wagner’s late operas without being impressed
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with the linguistic power of the artist who can express the most varied feelings through
the medium of musical forms. Similarly we are impressed with [Michelangelo’s] pictures
as an eloquent appeal for greater humanity in religion, in the administration of justice
and in the intercourse of nations with each other. 
8 There are indeed many points of analogy between the art of writing and the other arts
and it is certainly helpful when anyone [11] of these, which may have progressed more
rapidly than the others, should diffuse the benefits of that progress to its sister arts. Thus
architecture may present us with the clearest notions of construction, sculpture with that
of form, painting may teach us the secrets of color and light, and music the worth of
harmony. Even if the special idea of one art should be discernible in all the rest, the
fullest development of that art cannot be secured except upon the condition of freedom.
Kant recognized this when he [tells] us that art is free production and [Victor] Cousin
when he says “a condition of art which it cannot renounce without being destroyed is
that it be free, or in other words that it be the servant of nothing except itself.” [12]
Sculpture  and  painting  are  enslaved  to  architecture[;]  they  cannot  be  more  than
constructed ornament and decoration. It is only as free and independent arts that their
own growth can reach its highest point. A similar misfortune befalls the study of art, if it
be pursued merely in the spirit of literary study. We may as a result have beautifully
written lines of the artists (as Vasari), or elaborate works upon various schools of art
treated still  in the metaphysical  method (e.g.  Lübke),  we may have literary treatises
whose subject is art (e.g. Ruskin, Taine) and yet feel something wanting. [13] The product
is merely a department of literature, interesting to men of literary tastes rather than
helpful to the cause of art. 
9 The demand which practical  artists  make upon the thinking of  today is  that  objects
rather  than ideas  or  persons,  or  modes  of  expression,  should be made the foremost
subject of study so that the experience of the past may be available for practical guidance
in the future. Neither the mystical [14] nor the metaphysical nor the literary thinkers are
sufficiently skilled in the observation of things, as distinguished from ideas and words, to
take upon [themselves] this task in hand. Nor can [this task] be relegate to practitioners
absorbed as they are in the technical methods of special arts. What is needed is evidently
that a wider survey of the subject be taken under the guidance of the scientific method,
which has been so fruitful in its results in other departments of knowledge. A leading
characteristic of the scientific method is the application of experience to the increase of
knowledge. And this is precisely what is needed in the present case – a [summarizing] [15]
of the laws which are obtainable from a study of objects of art and an application of such
laws to near cases. We need not discuss the possibility of the scientific method in dealing
with this subject for that method is applicable in all departments of knowledge wherever
the  class  of  phenomena are  sufficiently  clear  and distinct  to  be  made  the  object  of
observation. It is necessary only to separate from other phenomena those which shall be
our special subject of study.
10 In the widest sense art comprehends all things we find in any way put together, formed
or made. In this sense art is distinguished [16] from chaos. In the condition of perfect
chaos  there  are  no  laws.  In  the  condition  of  art,  the  universe  assumes  form  and
statements may be made concerning it which are either true or false. It is evident then
that all sciences in the widest sense deal with objects of art and we must proceed to bring
our subject within practical limitations.
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11 A second and more limited definition of art, confines it to the things formed or made by
man. This distinguishes art from nature, [17] a distinction which we must be careful to
regard as a practical limitation rather than as a definition. Art is not ever in this limited
sense, opposed to nature, but rather a part of a fulfilment of nature – that part of nature
in which man appears distinctly as formative agent. [18] The things made by man form
[an] art-universe by themselves, not unrelated to, but a part of the great universe of art
not made by man. But this lesser universe is large enough, yet far too large to form a field
of  study  by  itself.  We  must  still  further  limit  the  subject  before  we  can  handle  it
practically. The total universe of things made by man shows very different characters. It
is  in  the  widest  sense  an  artistic  process  by  which  man  [19]  forms  mythologies,
governments,  [and] sciences, yet the results differ greatly from those of architecture,
sculpture, and painting, which may have been [inspired] by precisely the same motives.
Discussed as products the latter are distinguished from the rest as being visible products.
They appeal to us through impressions made upon the eye. This suggests a differentiation
of all the sensible from the insensible products of human activity and it is evident that to
the former [20] rather than [to] the latter that the science of art is limited. The sensible
arts would then be naturally classified according to the sense organ through which they
make their appeal to us. [Gastronomies], [perfumes], music and sculpture fall naturally
into their own classes. So divergent however are these fields of study from an objective
standpoint that the practical student must still further limit his field. [21] Let us then
confine our attention to the arts which address themselves to the organ of sight, leaving
music and poetry and all the arts which appeal to us through the other senses to form
separate fields by themselves.
12 Our definition is not yet complete. The arts do not aim to impress the senses merely, but
through  sense  impressions  to  arouse  the  higher  forms  of  consciousness[:]  memory,
understanding, imagination, [22] emotion, will. In this complete sense we exclude from
our field all products of activity that serve a purely material purpose. A house, if it be a
mere box for shelter, is not specifically a work of art. It becomes so only when by its
proportions, the relations of its voids and solids, its decorative members and other such
qualities, an appeal is made to our higher consciousness. A dress may be a mere covering
for the body – and mere garments are hardly more than this – [24] or it may be designed
to arouse the emotion of others – as women’s dresses sometimes are – and thus become a
work of art. In this more specific sense art is to be distinguished from manufacture and
other similar forms of industry. [25] 
13 It is because of this latter purpose that architecture, sculpture, and painting have been
selected as  convenient classifications of  the visible arts.  This  classification,  it  will  be
recognized, is not exhaustive or complete. It is practical rather than logical and is too
frequently  adopted,  because  of  its  convenience,  without  being  investigated  or
understood. A thorough classification of the visible arts should rather proceed to indicate
the kinds of  things that affect  the organ of  sight.  These we may distinguish broadly
according as they affect us by means of form or color. [26]
Form
I)  Lines  –  graphic
arts
1) drawing – pencil, pen, crayon, brush, etc.
2) engraving – copper, wood, etc.
3) Etching = 1) + 2)
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4) Weaving – embroiders, lace, textiles
II) Surfaces – plastic
arts
1) marble & stone cutting, wood, ivory
2) ceramics, bronzes, moulded glass
3) wrought iron, refuse, hammered




I) Light & shade 1) selection of shades, use of light & shadow
II)  color  -
chromatics
Playing  of  color  (mosaic  (glass,  ivory,  woods,  stone,  marble,
illumination))(painting(wood, canvas)
[27]   
14 Having selected the class of objects however limited or extensive that class may be – by
what method shall we proceed to study them? By all means let us adopt the method by
which our knowledge of the subject may be best extended and by which our conclusions
may receive the concurrence of all who may properly examine the facts. [28] What we
need  is  not  so  much  [a  knowledge  of  the  principles  of  induction,  deduction  and
hypothesis] to import a system of thought into the subject, as it is to secure from the start
the right point of view and a few inspiring ideas to guide us in entering upon our work.
[29] The point of view which we have reached as the right [one] is the simple and direct
study of  the facts,  accepting from every other department all  the help we need and
enslaving ourselves to none with our [energies.] Directed to the complete organization of
knowledge within our limited sphere and ever asking to apply this knowledge to unlock
the meaning of new facts and reveal the existence of new laws. [30]
15 We have recently been told what that method has done for our knowledge of history and
politics and we cannot be blind to the fact that the most fruitful study that is given to the
department of art at the present day is inspired by the same scientific spirit. Ever since
the close of the last century the [29/30] method of work in this department has become
more and more exact and the excavations, investigations and discoveries more and more
significant. This method we believe has been a natural growth within the limits of the
subject, rather than a method foisted upon us from without. Within a year after Darwin
had published his Origin of Species there appeared in England a work on the Development of
Christian Architecture in Italy [by William Sebastian Okely] in which the gradual evolution
of one species of architecture out of another was distinctly shown by a [31] series of
diagrams.  This idea of evolution is one of the inspiring ideas we have referred to as
leading to fruitful results.  It is already revolutionizing the old ideas of spontaneously
generated arts. Even Greek Art, which stands most prominently to the imagination as the
shining example of original and creative minds, is more and more being recognized as
dependent upon the Orient for almost the entire series of its forms. When therefore any
artistic form is presented to the mind and we seek to understand it, we are at once led to
[32] inquire into the series of persisting forms which prepared the way for it, assuming
that artistic forms develop not per saltum but by a gradual series of changes. 
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16 To establish a series of forms is an important task to which the student of today is called
to contribute his share of labor. This is not a mere archaeological task, in the sense that
we  are  satisfied  when  we have  ascertained  the  relative  antiquity  of  objects,  it  is  a
scientific task of establishing a progressive series so that any particular [33] form in the
series may be better understood in the light of what has preceded and followed it. We
may borrow from the archaeologist all that he may have ascertained with regard to the
antiquity of the monuments in which we are interested. This will aid us in establishing
our series. The archaeologist on the other hand may frequently have no other means of
determining the antiquity of an object than by the position it occupies in such a formal
series. He then becomes the borrower from the student of artistic forms. The two cover
the same field [34] when the archaeologist limits his attention to artistic objects and the
student of art limits his to the archaeological side of his subject. 
17 The attempt to establish a series indicating the actual state of progress in any department
of art gives rise to a new exercise of the imagination. Only in comparatively recent times
can we expect to find actually existing monuments in sufficient number to enable us to
trace the development from actually existing [specimens]. Here also and still more in the
art of remote periods are we obliged to reconstruct in [our] imagination forms that no
longer exist  in part.  [35] Such reconstructions may be accomplished with far greater
security today than they could have been a few generations ago. When a writer like Mr.
Fergusson [restores] to [our] imagination an Assyrian palace with a careless mingling of
Russian, Greek and Assyrian elements we at once discard his reconstruction as worthless.
Even an elementary knowledge of ancient art is sufficient to inform us that such hybrid
specimens could never have existed in ancient Assyria.  The use of  the scientific  [36]
imagination is in constant demand in the history of art. So many objects come down to us
in  fragmentary  condition  –  in  so  many  series.  There  are  missing  links  that  we  are
constantly  required  to  complete  by  supplying  the  absent  data.  The  exercise  of  the
scientific imagination is one of the inspiring factors in the new method of work. It is of
the nature of prediction and such predictions are being constantly verified. When Dr.
Waldstein recognized in an unclassified marble head in the Louvre workmanship,  he
predicted that it would fit upon one of [37] the headless Lapiths of the Parthenon metopes
and so it did. When Brunn recognized in a few statues in Italy characteristics of style that
seemed to radiate from the west coast of Asia Minor, he predicted the great discoveries in
Pergamon which since have been made. [38]
18 A still  wider prospect and still  stronger inspiration is in store when the comparative
methods of research are adopted. The tracing of the line of a single art form implies a
constant comparison. Without such comparisons we could not establish our series – but
we shall find the same original form under different conditions following different lines
of development [39] or the various arts in any one country progressing at differing rates.
Thus Byzantine art in extending to southern countries is developed in the direction of the
graphic  arts.  Under  Mohammedian  influence  it  [undergoes]  an  architectural  decline
while its ornamental and decorative features are developed to an extraordinary degree.
Travelling  northward  its  graphic  elements  remain  unchanged  for  centuries,  but
architecturally it develops with the bizarre forms of complicated [domical] structures of
the Russian churches. [40] Such differences as these are interesting from the comparative
standpoint and offer a new series of problems for [solution]. The agreements also are no
less striking. In Greek architecture and sculpture we find low, sturdy forms succeeded by
higher, slenderer ones – the same order of development that we find in the transition
On Scientific Method in the Study of Art
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
7
from Romanesque to Gothic. Is this to be explained by the similarities of human nature?
Then what are the traits in human nature which [41] lead men under the most varied
circumstances to follow the same order of growth? Or is it to be explained by a similarity
of  social  conditions?  Then  what  are  the  conditions  that  thus  effect  the  artistic
development of a people? Thus the comparative method leads us at once into contact
with  psychological  and  sociological  problems.  [I  have  often  thought  it  strange  that
political [economists] of note should expend so much labor upon the commodities which
we have classed as objects of industrial art and that they affect to despise the objects of
fine arts as useless luxuries – as if an object which supplied a bodily want were more
useful than that which stimulates and nurtures and calms the mind. For the purposes of
scientific study as well as for the purposes of the things themselves, our sympathies are
[with] the man who said “give me then the luxuries and let the necessities take care of
themselves.”] [42] 
19 We have thus far treated our subject as a mere study of forms and principles concerning
[43] forms. We have also to consider the element of color as another mode by which
objects impress us through the eye. This is a more difficult subject than the study of
forms, especially as color is usually considered in works of art as a mere concomitant of
form. But it is evident that the various modes of influencing the mind by means of the
colors must fall within the sphere of our study. All the possibilities of color combinations
whether by the mixing of pigments or of [44] lights or the purely subjective combinations
should be known to the student of art both as matters of experimental research & as
objects of  historic [interpretation].  It  is  easy,  for example,  if  we should proceed in a
purely empirical way to accept only a few pairs of colors as complementary to each other.
Whereas if by being complementary we mean that color which being combined with the
other will give white light, it is easy to see that the number of such pairs is infinite. For if
x  stand  for  white  [45]  light  &  a for  any  color,  it  is  evident  that  x  –  a will  be  the
complementary  of  a,  whatever  a may  be.  And  from  the  coefficient  of  the  binomial
theorem we may determine exactly how many pairs of complementary colors there will
be, under any given analogies of white light.
20 Let …
x = white light
a = a color or combination of color
b = x – a , the complementary of a 
n = the number of colors into which white light is analyzed
21 So  much  for  the  number  of  complementary  colors  –  but  there  will  be  many  other
numerical [46] and non-numerical relations of colors which must be introduced into a
comprehensive study of  the subject.  The chemist,  the physicist,  the psychologist,  the
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student of classical literature, and lastly the physicians may all interest themselves in the
subject of color. Still there remains the point of view [of] the student of art to determine
the conditions and laws under which the universe of color may be made to satisfy the
psychical want of man. We have only in our imagination or in fact [to] eliminate the
element of color and what a different universe would this be. We have [47] again only to
adjust polarizing apparitions and we have revealed to [ourselves] a whole universe of
colors that under normal conditions we never see. There may be still other universes of
color  within  our  grasp  of  which  we  have  never  dreamed.  The  utilization  of  all  the
possibilities of color for psychical purpose belong to the artists. [48]
22 Thus far we have spoken of forms and colors as things in themselves and outlined a
method of the study which is akin to the biological method on the one side [and the]
mathematical-physical on the other. The analogy of the scientific study of art and the
present study of biology is a striking one. In the study of constructions, implements, and
drawings of prehistoric, primitive or underdeveloped man, we have [49] a department
corresponding to paleontology. In this study of historic art we have the morphology of
the subject. In the comparative view of different arts, or the arts of different peoples, we
have  a  department  corresponding  to  comparative  morphology.  And  finally  in  the
interpretation of artistic forms we have the physiology of art. In the study of color the
analogies  to  the  biological  treatment  are  not  so  striking.  [50]  The  physiology or
interpretation of  art  comes last  for the forms must be studied as forms before their
meaning can be properly understood. In this part of our subject we view works of art as
serving a purpose. [51] That purpose we recognize in our definition as a psychological one
as the end and aim of a work of art is through sense impression to excite some kind of
psychic feeling. This affords us a new basis of classification. Some works of art address
mainly the senses, the gratification of the eye by combinations of form and color. Others
address the imagination and lift us above the commonplace into a new ideal universe.
And again others appeal to the memory [52] and recall scenes or faces which we do not
wish to lose. But we cannot rest content with a psychological classification alone. What
we wish to know is not the mental [53] faculty of the nervous centres involved in the
contemplation of artistic things. This falls to the lot of the psychologist. What we wish to
know in interpreting a work of  art  is  not only (1)  its  purpose but also (2)  how that
purpose has been accomplished (process) [and] (3) whether it has been accomplished in
the  best  possible  way  (degree  of  success).  All  of  these  three  questions  are  to  be
determined from a study of the objects themselves and from other similar objects rather
than from the feelings they excite within us. Hence in the interpretation of works of art[,]
[54] if we would eliminate as far as possible the personal equation and reach conclusions
of general and enduring value, we must proceed methodologically – and in our judgment,
the best method to secure that result is the scientific method.[55]
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